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“Were I called on to define, very briefly, the term Art, I should call it 
‘the reproduction of what the Senses perceive in Nature through the veil 
of the soul.’ The mere imitation, however accurate, of what is in Nature, 
entitles no man to the sacred name of ‘Artist.’” 
– Edgar Allan Poe1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Artists have been attempting to reproduce reality through their 
artwork for centuries, providing a rich history behind the relationship 
between art and imitation. For example, Socrates introduced one popular 
concept of imitation, or mimesis, in fifth-century B.C. Athens,2  whereby 
stating that “‘imitation’ meant the copying of the appearances of 
things.”3 Plato and Aristotle further shaped this idea, theorizing that 
imitation resulted from “reflection upon painting and sculpture.”4 
Contemporaneous notions reflected the idea that imitation meant 
“reproducing the external world,”5 On the other hand, modern discourse 
has reiterated Poe’s general sentiment that art and imitation are strange 
bedfellows.6 However, in contrast to these modern notions, the United 
Nations Education, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), in apparent agreement with Aristotle, has defined an artist as 
“any person who creates or gives creative expression to, or re-creates 
works of art . . . .”7 
Copyright law’s treatment of subject matter drawn from the real 
world reflects this dilemma concerning the relationship between art and 
imitation. The United States has recently aligned itself with Poe’s 
general sentiment. It has done so under the guise of copyright’s 
 
 1. THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 59 (Robert Andrews ed., Columbia Univ. 
Press 1993). 
 2. 3 THE DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 
226 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1973–74) [hereinafter HISTORY OF IDEAS]. 
 3. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 4. Id.; see also The University of Chicago, Theories of Media, Keywords Glossary, 
available at http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/mimesis.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 5. 3 HISTORY OF IDEAS, supra note 2. 
 6. Tom Huhn, The Movement of Mimesis: Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art' in 
Relation to Adorno and Lyotard, 22 (4) PHIL. SOC. CRITICISM 45, 46 (1996) (“If mimesis occurs 
only as imitation, portrayal, or representation, it remains but a false and falsifying movement.”), 
available at http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/4/45 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 7. Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist: UNESCO, Oct. 27, 1980, 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13138&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (emphasis added) (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 830 (5th 
ed., 2007). 
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requirement of originality, requiring an additional authorial “creative 
spark”8 that has not always been required in the United States or 
elsewhere. 
Copyright protects an author’s original expression, as opposed to the 
underlying facts or ideas themselves,9 and circumscribes the ability of 
others to copy that expression.10 Whether aspects of an artistic imitation 
of the real world are the proper subject of copyright appears to be a 
settled point in more traditional contexts, such as photography.11 
However, recent advancements in digital imaging technology have 
allowed digital artists to imitate reality in ways that are both reminiscent 
of the old and profoundly new in their application and scope. For 
instance, the present ability to digitally model and animate imitations of 
real people, places, and things in a virtual three-dimensional environment 
has raised a host of new and complicated legal issues, many related to 
copyright.  In the first federal case to directly address the question, the 
Tenth Circuit held that copyright does not protect digital models created 
to imitate preexisting objects.12 
This Article addresses a few of the issues that confront digital artists 
and modeling companies in the context of copyright law’s requirements 
of originality and independent creation, and provides a comparative look 
at potential protection for these types of digital models under differing 
definitions of originality. In an age when “[a]nimators deal with pixels as 
well as paint brushes,”13 the laws of the United States potentially offer 
digital artists less protection in this context than do the laws of other 
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. Specifically, the 
requirement of originality after Feist and the lack of sui generis database 
protection in the United States provide less protection for digital visual 
 
 8. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 9. Id. at 350 (“No author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to those 
aspects of the work -- termed 'expression' -- that display the stamp of the author's originality.” (citing 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985))). 
 10. Feist Publ'ns Inc., 488 U.S. at 350 (“[O]nly the compiler’s [expression] may be protected; 
the raw facts may be copied at will.”). 
 11. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court found 
copyrightable expression in Napoleon Sarony’s photographs of Oscar Wilde “so far as they are 
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.” Id. at 58.  See also 1-3 NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[C][3] (2008) (“As applied to a photograph of a pre-existing product, that 
bedrock principle [of originality] means that the photographer manifestly cannot claim to have 
originated the matter depicted therein . . . .”). 
 12. Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1006 (2009). 
 13. Dave Kehr, When a Cyberstar is Born, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, § 2 at 1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/arts/film-when-a-cyberstar-is-born.html?pagewanted=all (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
SPRING 2010  Independent Creation 
97 
 
effects artists engaged in modeling reality than do the laws of these other 
jurisdictions. In Part II, this Article examines some examples of recent 
advancements in digital imaging technology; specifically, the ability to 
create digital clones of preexisting things, such as living or deceased 
personalities and other, non-human, objects. In Part III, the Article 
provides a comparative analysis of copyright’s requirement of originality 
in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Part IV presents a 
brief look at sui generis protection under the European Union’s recent 
directive on the legal protection of databases. Finally, Part V offers a 
brief conclusion. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART 
Digital technology is rapidly expanding the artist’s ability to imitate 
reality in various ways. In addition to the photograph’s ability to 
reproduce reality, digital technology and computer generated imagery 
(CGI) enable artists to animate their reproduced subjects in realistic 
three-dimensional form, albeit in two-dimensional media. Digital artists 
also have the ability to combine digitally created work with photographic 
and cinematographic material. As one commentator put it, “C.G.I. 
aspires to something different: a reality that is realer than real, more 
vivid and more dramatic.”14 This technological evolution looks “toward 
what some call the ‘holy grail’ of reanimation—virtual humans who can 
see, speak, hear, touch and be touched, exhibit behavior, and think just as 
we do.”15 In some cases, both the environment and the actor are digitally 
created, or re-created, in photorealistic, or nearly photorealistic, form. “A 
character in Jean-Luc Godard’s ‘Petit Soldat’ (1960) memorably 
observed that ‘cinema is truth 24 times a second.’ The figure today is 
considerably less than that—maybe two or three times a second, at 
most.”16 
In reality, the digital artist’s processes are really “nothing more than 
technologically advanced versions of traditional animation techniques, 
with the computer console replacing the drawing board and animation 
stand of the past.”17 The most prolific use of CGI to date has not been to 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Joel Anderson, Note, What's Wrong with this Picture?: Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors 
in the Age of Virtual Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (quoting Joseph J. Beard, 
Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the Quick, the Dead and the 
Imaginary, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 441, 444 (2001)). 
 16. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 17. Id. 
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create digital actors, synthespians,18 or “create fantastic planets and 
sprawling, surreal urban environments,”19 but rather to make smaller, 
less noticeable alterations. “Much of the dreamy, nostalgic vision of 
Paris in Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s . . . ‘Amelie’ was created by digitally 
retouching actual locations—cars were removed from quaint, curving 
streets, graffiti was wiped away and perfect clouds were placed in the 
Parisian sky.”20 The apparent potential to recreate or imitate reality, 
whether modern or historical reality, through CGI is virtually endless. 
A. The Synthespian: A Brief History 
In recent years, “[v]irtual humans have found steady employment in 
the entertainment field.”21 However, despite its recent popularity, the 
idea of putting digital actors to work has a relatively long history. 
Newspaper cartoonist Winsor McCay created the first “superstar 
synthespian” in 1914,22 as Gertie the Dinosaur came to life onstage as 
McCay pretended to sketch Gertie on a large drawing board—actually, a 
movie screen.23 McCay had meticulously hand-drawn the animated film 
frame-by-frame and, as he coaxed Gertie out of hiding to munch some 
greens, the synthespian became a reality.24 
Following Gertie the Dinosaur, the first celebrity synthespian was 
Marilyn Monroe, who died on August 5, 1962, fifteen years before her 
appearance in the 1987 independent film “Rendezvous in Montreal.”25 
Subsequently, Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow, released in 2004 
by Paramount Pictures, which featured the reanimated clone of Sir 
Laurence Oliver, a celebrity who died in 1989. The film depicted Sir 
Laurence Oliver performing scenes and engaging in activity the actor had 
never participated in while alive,26 and marked “the first time a dead 
 
 18. Jeff Kleiser, an L.A. based digital effects expert, coined the term “synthespian” “when he 
created the industry's first virtual actor (or "vactor') for his 1988 short film ‘Nestor Sextone for 
President.’” Leslie Kurtz, Digital Actors and Copyright—From the Polar Express to Simone, 21 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 783, 783 n.1 (2005).   Kleiser derived the term from 
the words “synthetic thespian.”   Adam Faier, Note, Digital Slaves of the Render Farms?: Virtual 
Actors and Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 321, 325 (citing Michael 
A. Hiltzik & Alex Pham, Synthetic Actors Guild, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2001, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/08/news/mn-60707 (last visited March 15, 2010)). 
 19. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the 
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165, 1169 (2001). 
 22. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156. 
 26. Id. at 155. 
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actor’s reanimated clone perform[ed] completely original scenes. . . .”27 
Such occurrences are now commonplace in today’s digital era. Digital 
technology has made it possible to watch video of Abraham Lincoln on 
national television,28 digital doubles of the baby in Lemony Snicket’s a 
Series of Unfortunate Events and of Tobey Maguire and Alfred Molina 
in Spiderman,29 Elton John acting alongside James Cagney, Humphrey 
Bogart, and Louis Armstrong, and John Wayne in a beer commercial.30 
In Jurassic Park, Robert Patrick’s digital double, having previously 
appeared as the “liquid metal cyborg in Terminator 2: Judgment Day,”31 
returned to life (and death) as “T-Rex’s meal.”32 Filmmaker Andrew 
Niccols captured one of the possible synthespian dilemmas in his 2002 
film S1mOne (or “Simone”). In Simone, a struggling movie producer 
played by Al Pacino “create[d] a digital replacement when a 
temperamental [real-world] actress walk[ed] out in the middle of a 
film.”33 When the digital replacement “becomes an overnight sensation,” 
however, Pacino’s character struggles to “maintain the fiction that she is 
real.”34 
B. The Holy Grail: A Perfect Clone 
It has been said that the “holy grail” of CGI is to clone a living, 
breathing, human being in “photorealistic and perfectly animated” digital 
form.35 For years, this rapidly advancing technology has been “begging 
for its moment of truth.”36 In 2009, The Curious Case of Benjamin 
Button won the Academy Award for Best Visual Effects, and for some, 
the moment had arrived. David Fincher’s film included numerous CGI 
environments, crowd simulations, digitally created set extensions, and 
matte paintings.37 Most impressively, however, fifty-two minutes of the 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Bryant Frazier, Creating New Video Footage of Abraham Lincoln: How Studio Macbeth 
Brought History to Life in Maya, FILM AND VIDEO, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://www.studiodaily.com/filmandvideo/projects/10470.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 29. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 786. 
 30. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156. 
 31. Id.; Beard, supra note 21, at 1169. 
 32. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156; Beard, supra note 21, at 1169. 
 33. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Renee Dunlop, The Curious Case of Benjamin Button: The Beginning of the End for the 
Uncanny Valley.    
Digital Domain Reveals Its Part in Holy Grail of VFX, CGSociety: Prod. Focus, Jan. 6, 2009, 
http://features.cgsociety.org/story_custom.php?story_id=4848&page=1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Press Release, Oscar Winner for Best Visual Effects ‘The Curious Case of Benjamin 
Button’ Shaped with Autodesk Technology (Feb. 24, 2009), available at 
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film also featured a 100% digitally animated 3D model of Brad Pitt’s 
head pasted onto the bodies of various other actors. Fincher casted petite 
actors to portray Benjamin (Pitt) at various ages, but because “lighting, 
continuity, and tracking issues” would have made merely compositing 
photographs of Pitt’s head onto various actors impossible, Fincher hired 
Digital Domain to create and composite the digital head onto these 
actors’ bodies instead. 38 Digital Domain created casts of Pitt’s face and 
head, as well as shoulders-up casts of the various other actors who would 
embody Benjamin for much of the film. Using these casts of Pitt’s head, 
an artist created maquettes of Benjamin at 60, 70, and 80 years of age.39 
Digital Domain then scanned the busts, creating three-dimensional 
digital meshes, and photographed Pitt in 120 different facial poses.40 
Digital Domain manipulated these digital meshes to create thousands of 
possible expressions in line with Pitt’s photographs and retargeted the 
expressions onto the scanned Benjamin heads.41 Combining the busts 
and the expressions eliminated gaps between the facial markers 
employed in more traditional marker based capture.42 In effect, Digital 
Domain “effectively had the three old Benjamin CGI characters 
performing . . . with Brad Pitt’s full range of emotions and 
expressions.”43 According to VFX Executive Producer Ed Ulbrich, “You 
can put 500 markers on the face, but you still don’t get what happens 
between those markers, and that was what was critically important to 
us.”44 CGI’s moment may have arrived with The Curious Case of 
Benjamin Button, but its arrival did more than just open eyes to the 
effectiveness of CGI. It also opened the door to a whole new series of 
potential legal issues. 
Pitt’s participation in Benjamin Button was voluntary, and the use of 
his scanned facial data may have been contractually limited to the scope 
of the film. However, his facial scans—the digital meshes and 3D 
models created by Digital Domain—still exist. They can be reused. This 
may become yet a bigger issue in the future when the practice of body-
scanning actors becomes even more commonplace. Robert Zemeckis, 
director of such films as Beowulf, The Polar Express, Back to the Future, 
 
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/item?siteID=123112&id=12609262&linkID=5572947 (last 
visited March 15, 2010). 
 38. Dunlop, supra note 35. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Dunlop, supra note 35. 
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Forrest Gump, and Cast Away, has already made digital scans of all of 
the actors in his films.45 “I know some are worried about what uses will 
be made of it,” Zemeckis said. “But think of what we could have—
complete digital versions of actors at various stages in their life.”46 
Not everyone is on board with this idea. Tom Hanks, whose image 
was scanned in during production of the Zemeckis film, The Polar 
Express, has voiced concern that his “hard-fought performances can be 
tampered with by after-the-fact computer amateurs, or that someone 
might make unwanted use of his digital self.”47 On the other hand, Hanks 
has also come to the realization that, “It’s going to happen. And I’m not 
sure what actors can do about it.”48 But some, like George Lucas, who 
claims to have used more digital characters than anyone else in the 
industry, have stated that they have no intention of cloning an actual 
human character. “It just doesn’t work,” Lucas said. “You need actors to 
do that.”49 But to Steven Spielberg, ‘‘It’s a nonissue.’’50 
C. Robbing the Grave and Resurrecting the Dead 
Aside from cloning living humans, there have also been numerous 
successful attempts to resurrect deceased personalities on the big screen, 
like the appearance of Sir Lawrence Oliver in Sky Captain and the World 
of Tomorrow.51 However, photorealistic cloning has not only been the 
product of Hollywood; smaller studios and individual artists have also 
gotten in on the action. On February 16, 2009, the History Channel aired 
a two-hour documentary entitled Stealing Lincoln’s Body that featured 
photorealistic virtual representations of Abraham Lincoln in a full 
motion video. Ray Downing and his team at Studio Macbeth in New 
York spent a whole year creating “about five minutes of faux footage” of 
the dead president by scanning life masks,52 creating animatable 3D 
 
 45. Rick Lyman, Movie Stars Fear Inroads by Upstart Digital Actors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2001, § 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/08/us/movie-stars-fear-inroads-by-
upstart-digital-actors.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; Beard, supra note 21, at 1218 (“Members of S.A.G. [may already] be protected to 
some degree against unauthorized re-use of their existing performances,” as Professor Beard has 
pointed out; “[h]owever, it should be noted the S.A.G. restrictions on re-use apply ‘only if the 
performer is recognizable.’ Actor Robert Patrick's digital replica starred as liquid metal cyborg T-
1000 in Terminator 2: Judgment Day. The digital replica was re-used as "lunch-meat" for the digital 
T-Rex in Jurassic Park. But, that scene showed only his body and limbs - not his face.   He was thus 
not ‘recognizable’ and the S.A.G. re-use restriction would not apply.”). 
 49. Lyman, supra note 45. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156. 
 52. Hugh Hart, Stealing Lincoln's Body Reanimates 'Asymmetric' President, WIRED Blog, 
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models of the president’s face,53 and mapping the three-dimensional 
animation over the head of a live actor,54 similar to the process employed 
to create Benjamin Button’s digital head. They even had an actor mimic 
the particular physical characteristics reportedly exhibited by Lincoln 
while walking in real life.55 
The task of resurrecting Lincoln had a very personal attraction for 
Downing, and the fulfillment was an achievement of special 
magnitude.56 Downing and his team created the digital Lincoln in their 
spare time while keeping up with their regular paying projects.57 After 
completing the project, Studio Macbeth claimed to have created the “first 
new images of Lincoln in 140 years.”58 Of Lincoln, Downing said, “I 
never realized how much I wanted to see him walk down a street. . . until 
I did.”59 However, reactions to Downing’s project have not all been 
positive. One reporter said that the Studio’s work had “misplaced truth in 
history and missed the line between history and art.”60 
The History Channel documentary, which licensed the images from 
Downing after they were already substantially complete,61 documented 
the little known story of a series of grave robberies targeted at Lincoln’s 
remains.62 The documentary’s title is ironically fitting. Lincoln’s body 
has been stolen—cloned, resurrected, and animated in digital form. On a 
whim, Downing can now insert Lincoln’s digital replica into any 
imaginable situation with a few clicks of his mouse. Lincoln is not 
Studio Macbeth’s last resurrection project, either. Downing has recently 
reported that his next historical clone will really “make a splash.”63 
Of course, these are not the art and entertainment world’s first 
 
Feb. 13, 2009, http://blog.wired.com/underwire/2009/02/abraham-lincoln.html (last visited March 
15, 2010). 
 53. Frazier, supra note 28. 
 54. Hart, supra note 52. 
 55. Frazier, supra note 28. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Studio Macbeth Blog Post, First New Images of Lincoln in 140 Years, July 2, 2008, 
http://abrahamlincolnpictures.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-new-images-of-lincoln-in-140.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 59. Brad Brevet, Bringing Abraham Lincoln Back to Life, RopeOfSilicon.com, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://www.ropeofsilicon.com/article/bringing-abraham-lincoln-back-to-life (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
 60. Studio Macbeth Blog Post, Welcome, July 21, 2008, 
http://abrahamlincolnpictures.blogspot.com/2008/07/welcome.html (last visited March 15, 2010). 
 61. Frazier, supra note 28. 
 62. See Stealing Lincoln’s Body, History.com, 
http://www.history.com/genericContent.do?id=61902 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 63. Frazier, supra note 28. 
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attempts to create a photorealistic digital representation of an actual 
person. In fact, it is happening all the time. Digital imaging technology 
“has transformed filmed entertainment from the bottom up, removing the 
assurance that what the camera sees is, was, or is remotely related to 
something real. Seeing is no longer believing, even to the tiny degree it 
once was.”64 And of course, the cloning of actual people is not the only 
sort of digital replication that is occurring at a rapid pace. Products, 
automobiles, buildings, and entire cities are also being scanned or 
modeled in photorealistic clarity, and many consumers are all too happy 
to accept what they see as real. 
Digital clones have come a long way since the “liquid metal cyborg 
in Terminator 2: Judgment Day”65 and the thousands of digital extras 
that populated films like Titanic, Lord of the Rings, Gladiator,66 and 
Pearl Harbor.67 Merely compositing footage to, for example, allow Tom 
Hanks to meet Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon68 has become 
old news. Perhaps the future contains a line of new John Wayne 
westerns,69 or perhaps “Marilyn Monroe and Russell Crowe could co-
star in a new film.”70 These possibilities raise a variety of fascinating 
legal concerns, including violations of the right of publicity, however this 
Article focuses predominantly on whether copyright or sui generis 
database laws should protect the digital artist’s creation embodying 
realistic depictions of real people—the basic digital model itself. 
One of the biggest obstacles to photorealistic animation is the artistic 
and technical limitations to the objective itself, especially when motion is 
involved. In The Curious Case of Benjamin Button, for example, 
animators had to go beyond traditional tracking techniques to attach the 
digital head to the neck and spine of various actors despite moving 
cameras and lens distortion.71 These obstacles are dissipating at a 
dramatic rate, however, as technology improves. On the other hand, 
some new legal obstacles facing digital artists are only just beginning to 
 
 64. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 65. See Beard, supra note 21, at 1169. 
 66. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 784 n.5 (“In 1997, digital passengers populated the deck of the 
Titanic in the Academy Award film, Titanic.” (citing Carolyn Giardina, Digital Human Creation 
Advances, Backstage, Nov. 26, 2004, at 4, available at 2004 WLNR 15829593) (“Digital extras 
provided a cast of thousands in King Arthur, Gladiator, and Lord of the Rings.” (citing Here's 
Looking at a Digitally Generated Kid, Sunday Bus., Oct. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 
7425572))). 
 67. Beard, supra note 21, at 1169. 
 68. Id. at 1206; Anderson, supra note 15, at 156. 
 69. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 785. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Dunlop, supra note 35. 
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become apparent. For example, copyright law’s requirement of 
originality and the lack of sui generis database protection in the United 
States may present artists with additional need to protect their digital data 
through technology and contract. Digitally recreating reality may also 
make an unwitting digital artist liable for violation of copyright, patent, 
trademark, and right of publicity laws. 
D. User-Generated Content: A Small Glimpse into the Future 
As digital modeling technology has begun to see rapid growth in 
user-generated content over the internet, some have commented that new 
technology has invited the great cloning debate into filmmaking. “It is 
the old Frankenstein scenario, played out in the most modern terms. 
Perhaps we will be able to bring back Cary Grant or Marilyn Monroe, 
but, like the mad doctor’s stitched-together monster, they probably won’t 
seem quite like their old selves.”72 Potentially, dead actors may work 
again and living actors might be employed to do things they never knew 
they did.73 Indeed, a celebrity’s virtual head may have already become a 
commodity on the internet. A preliminary search of the internet revealed 
digital models of Barack Obama, John McCain, Angelina Jolie, David 
Beckham, Jack Nicholson, Jessica Alba, Kevin Spacey, Sharon Stone, 
Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln, and Brad Pitt for sale online at prices 
ranging from $19 to $200 each.74 The majority of these models do not 
come close to the likes of Digital Domain’s photorealistic Benjamin 
Button, but most were probably created by individual artists in their 
basements and bedrooms, as opposed to established visual effects firms 
with Hollywood budgets. These artists are perhaps just hoping to make a 
few extra bucks and gain recognition in their own online communities by 
selling their own user-generated content online. 
Perhaps soon the masses will control the grail. 
III. COPYRIGHT: THE REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
A.Originality in the United States 
In the United States, copyright protects “original works of authorship 
 
 72. Kehr, supra note 13. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See VIP and Celebrities People 3D Models, FlatPyramid.com, 
http://flatpyramid.com/shopdisplayproducts.asp?catnameid=99&catname=VIP%20and%20Celebriti
es&id=0&maincategoryid=1&subcatid=4 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
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fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”75 The constitution of the 
United States mandates that works must exhibit some degree of 
originality before copyright protection will adhere to them.76 The 
Supreme Court has made it clear on multiple occasions that the terms 
“authors” and “writings” “presuppose [this] degree of originality.”77 
Despite this low bar, copyright does not protect facts or ideas, only 
expression.78 Oddly enough, the destiny of the digital model might be 
dictated by the fate of an ordinary phonebook in the United States 
Supreme Court.79 
In the landmark Supreme Court decision, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., Justice O’Connor declared, “The sine qua non of 
copyright is originality.”80 Despite its supreme and long-recognized 
importance to copyright law however, federal courts have not been 
consistent in interpreting exactly what originality required. The Second, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits historically adhered to a “creative 
selection” theory that rewarded creativity,81 while others circuits have 
granted protection for labor, skill, and investment on “sweat of the brow” 
principles.82 These two lines of cases present the two principal 
justifications for providing copyright protection in the first instance; as a 
reward for effort and investment, or as a reward for creativity and 
allowing the public access to creative works.83 The Feist decision, 
however, “dropped a bomb” on the country’s copyright jurisprudence 
when it espoused the former viewpoint.84 The Court held that some 
threshold amount of material must be “independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works)”85 and that the work 
must possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”86 The Court 
held, quite clearly, that creativity is the only valid basis for granting 
 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2008). 
 76. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
 77. Id.; Trade-Mark cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U.S. 53, 53 (1884). 
 78. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350. 
 79. Id. at 340; see Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1258 (10th 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1006 (2009). 
 80. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 81. Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1133 (2007). 
 82. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352. 
 83. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1134. 
 84. See id. at 1133 (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, Statement on H.R. 2652: The Collections of 
Information Antipiracy Act (Oct. 28, 1997), available at 
http://www.hyperlaw.com//topix/database/ginsburg.htm (attributing the quote to the Register of 
Copyrights at the time the Feist decision was announced) (last visited March 15, 2010)). 
 85. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 86. Id. 
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copyright protection.87 The required creativity is decidedly low,88 and 
the “vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess 
some creative spark.”89 However, this definition of originality precludes 
some factually based work from copyright protection, including, as we 
shall see, digital models of real life objects and the telephone directory at 
issue in the Feist case itself.90 
In the 1880 Supreme Court case Baker v. Selden,91 the Court held 
that bookkeeping forms, designed to illustrate a system of bookkeeping 
and “consisting of ruled lines and blank columns,”92 did not meet the 
required standard of originality.93 In that case, the Court found a 
distinction between the book itself and the system the forms illustrated—
only the former was the proper subject of copyright.94 In Feist, the court 
analogized the plaintiff’s telephone books to the forms in Baker, and held 
that copyright would not protect the listings in the telephone directory 
because the information was purely factual, arranged in alphabetical 
order, and did not “possess more than a de minimis quantum of 
creativity.”95 
Even after Feist, expression might be found in some creative 
arrangement of otherwise unprotected material.96 The Feist decision, 
 
 87. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1134. 
 88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004); BellSouth Adver. & 
Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); Sem-Torq, Inc. v. 
Kmart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc., v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 59 F.3d 
719 (7th Cir. 1995). In some post-Feist cases, however, federal appellate courts have upheld 
copyrights in factual compilations. See Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 
640 (7th Cir. 2003); TransWestern Publ’g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773 
(10th Cir. 1998); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos 
Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 67 F.3d 276 (11th Cir. 1995) (granting rehearing 
en banc); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Kregos v. 
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of 
Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 91. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
 92. Id. at 101. 
 93. Id. at 107 (“[T]he mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive 
right to make and use account books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and 
illustrated in said book.”) 
 94. Id. at 104 (“The use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of the book 
explaining it.   The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, 
sell, and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.”) 
 95. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). 
 96. Id. at 345 (“The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what 
order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by 
readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by 
the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may 
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however, explicitly overruled the idea that hard work and industrious 
labor alone would merit copyright protection.97 This doctrine, 
alternatively labeled “sweat of the brow” or “industrious collection,” had 
been circulating through a number of lower courts for years by the time 
Feist was decided.98 These lower courts adhered to the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine based on a line of authority that led all the way back to 
the English cases Kelly v. Morris and Morris v. Ashby from the 1860s.99 
A classic example of this doctrine, discussed in the Feist decision, stated 
that: 
 
[t]he right to copyright a book upon which one has 
expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon 
whether the materials which he has collected consist or 
not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such 
materials show literary skill or originality, either in 
thought or in language, or anything more than 
industrious collection. The man who goes through the 
streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the 
inhabitants, with their occupations and their street 
 
protect such compilations through the copyright laws.”) (citing 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 
2.11[D], 3.03 (2008))). 
 97. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 68, appeal dismissed 
by Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., v. Telstra Corp. Ltd., [2002] FCAFC 112, available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2001/612.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
In Kelly v. Morris, 1 Eq 697 (1866), the plaintiff claimed copyright in a street directory.   Sir Wood 
VC said: 
. . . a subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that which 
the first compiler has done.   In case of a road-book, he must count the 
milestones for himself . . . generally, he is not entitled to take one word of the 
information previously published without independently working out the 
matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common 
sources of information, and the only use he can legitimately make of a 
previous publication is to verify his own calculations and results when 
obtained.” Id. at 701–02. 
In Morris v. Ashbee, 7 Eq 34 (1868), the defendant in the earlier case, claimed copyright in his trade 
directory comprised of an alphabetical list of names and occupations of merchants and traders 
carrying on business in London.   Giffard VC said: 
The Plaintiff incurred the labour and expense first of getting the necessary 
information for the arrangement and compilation of the names as they stood in 
his directory, and then of making the actual compilation and arrangement . . . . 
[I]n a case such as this no one has a right to take the results of the labour and 
expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival publication, and 
thereby save himself the expense and labour of working out and arriving at 
these results by some independent road. If this was not so, there would be 
practically no copyright in such a work as a directory. Id. at 40–41. 
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number, acquires material of which he is the author.100 
 
In one earlier district court case, Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,101 
the court upheld a sculptor’s copyright in his miniaturized duplication of 
Rodin’s “Hand of God” sculpture. 102  Although not explicitly relying on 
the “sweat of the brow” doctrine, the court’s reasoning reflected similar 
concerns. Despite the fact that the plaintiff claimed his reproduction was 
designed “to duplicate as closely as possible the exact shape, patina, 
color and texture of the original,”103 the court found creative expression 
and originality in the “skill and originality” required to produce “an 
accurate scale reproduction.”104 In particular, the court found that “it 
takes “‘an extremely skilled sculptor’ many hours”105 to “produce a scale 
reduction of a great work with exactitude.”106 The combination of a 
slight difference in the base of the reproduction (the rear of the plaintiff’s 
base was closed, Rodin’s was open) “when coupled with the skilled 
scaled sculpture is itself creative.”107 
If not for the reasoning in later cases, despite their reluctance to 
overrule it, the Alva case might have provided an argument that digital 
models of actual objects are original, especially when the artist expended 
great effort to reproduce them on a much smaller scale. L. Batlin & Son, 
Inc. v. Snyder,108 a Second Circuit case of more recent vintage, though 
still pre-Feist, held that a mere change in medium was not enough to 
confer the requisite creativity.109 Sitting en banc, the court said that 
“there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial 
variation such as might occur in the translation to a different 
medium.”110 In Batlin, the appellant had copied a public domain Uncle 
Sam bank and translated the design from cast iron to plastic. Because 
various elements would “not reproduce well in plastic on a smaller size,” 
appellants deviated from the exact design of the original bank, changing 
 
 100. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Jeweler's Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922)). 
 101. Alva Studios, Inc., v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. at 266. 
 104. Id. at 267. 
 105. Id. at 266. 
 106. Id. at 267. 
 107. Id. 
 108. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 857 (1976). 
 109. The court quoted Professor Nimmer and held that “the mere reproduction of a work of art 
in a different medium should not constitute the required originality . . . .” Id. at 491. 
 110. Id. 
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the size of the bank and its base, the texture and shape and positioning of 
various elements, and changed arrows grasped in the eagle’s talons into 
leaves.111 The court concluded that the variations in the appellant’s bank 
were “trivial” because “the [plastic] bank is extremely similar to the cast 
iron bank, save in size and material.”112 The court found that the many 
similarities were more important than the differences, and held the bank 
not copyrightable.113 
Despite its holding, the en banc Second Circuit declined to overrule 
Alva or, apparently, the implicit “sweat of the brow” rewarded in that 
case, because “[t]he complexity and exactitude” involved in reproducing 
the Rodin sculpture was the product of “an extremely skilled sculptor” 
while the appellant’s bank was nothing more than a “‘knock-off’ 
reproduction.”114 Despite the confusing lack of consistency among the 
circuit courts prior to 1991, Feist has presumably cleared up any 
confusion these cases might have provided about the vitality of the 
“sweat of the brow” doctrine in the United States. 
However, to properly assess the copyrightability of digital clones 
against this backdrop of evolving originality jurisprudence, it is 
important to first understand a few of the creative and technical 
processes involved in creating these digital models. 
i. The cloning process 
There are essentially two general approaches to digitally cloning an 
individual or another object: a direct approach and an indirect 
approach.115 This Article will provide only a brief overview of these 
complex and rapidly evolving processes to provide the foundation 
required to analyze the resulting digital data in the context of copyright 
and database law. 
The direct approach involves using laser scanners or other types of 
 
 111. Id. at 489 (changes noted by the court included “the carpetbag shape of the plastic bank is 
smooth, the iron bank rough; the metal bank bag is fatter at its base; the eagle on the front of the 
platform in the metal bank is holding arrows in his talons while in the plastic bank he clutches leaves 
. . . [t]he shape of Uncle Sam's face is supposedly different, as is the shape and texture of the hats . . . 
[i]n the metal version the umbrella is hanging loose while in the plastic item it is included in the 
single mold. The texture of the clothing, the hairline, shape of the bow ties and of the shirt collar and 
left arm as well as the flag carrying the name on the base of the statute are all claimed to be different, 
along with the shape and texture of the eagles on the side.”). 
 112. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 491–92. 
 115. This definition is attributed to Professor Joseph Beard, who discussed the process of 
creating digital clones in some detail. See Beard, supra note 21, at 1172–90. 
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digital recording devices to capture the geometry of the object.116 This 
includes motion or performance capture, like that used in films such as 
The Polar Express, where the studio records an actor’s movements by 
digitally tracking various points on the actor.117 The indirect approach, 
utilized to create the models for Digital Domain’s Benjamin Button and 
Studio Macbeth’s Abraham Lincoln, involves the use of life masks, 
busts, photographs, and other reference material to model a realistic 
clone.118 In either case, the process results in a digital mesh that can be 
edited and manipulated in 3-D modeling software, such as Autodesk 
Maya or even free open source software such as Blender, to create an 
animatable model. These models, somewhat like a phone directory, exist 
as collections of data representing factual information. These data points 
can be expressed onscreen in modeling software as small dots placed at 
corresponding X-, Y-, and Z-axes, and each individual data point can be 
manipulated independently. The model itself can be animated, colored, 
textured, and rendered with a few clicks of a mouse. 
In the context of digital cloning, or digitally replicating other pre-
existing material, the requirement of originality presents a pressing 
question: Do these three-dimensional models exhibit the “spark of 
creativity” required by Feist? If the digital data is sufficiently original, it 
would be copyrightable.119 As Professor Leslie Kurtz pointed out, 
“Digital actors are created by combining elements of human beings and 
elements created by human beings. Only the latter are protected by 
copyright. Copyright . . . will not protect a person’s voice and image.”120 
On the other hand, the late Professor Joseph Beard believed that scanned 
data might exhibit the required originality to be copyrightable.121 
Professor Beard, however, was only cautiously optimistic.122 He felt that 
digitally sculpted models created independently of scanned data should 
be copyrightable, as essentially involving the same creativity as 
traditional sculptures.123 It was not until 2008 that a federal appellate 
court finally weighed in on the matter.124 However, the principal case 
discussed below, still leaves some of these questions unanswered. 
 
 116. Id. at 1172–73. This process was used to create the models at issue in Meshwerks, 
discussed infra. 
 117. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 786. 
 118. Beard, supra note 21, at 1186–90. 
 119. Id. at 1177. 
 120. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 791 (emphasis added). 
 121. Beard, supra note 21, at 1177. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 1188. 
 124. See Meshwerks v. Toyota, 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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ii. Meshwerks v. Toyota: Originality and digital models 
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit applied these long-standing rules of 
originality to digital models of real objects; in this case, Toyota 
automobiles.125 Concerning the requirement of independent creation, the 
Meshwerks court asked “how might that doctrine apply in an age of 
virtual worlds and digital media that seek to mimic the ‘real’ world, but 
often do so in ways that undoubtedly qualify as (highly) original?”126 In 
many ways, copyright law’s treatment of photography is telling and 
relevant to the issue of digitally cloning the real world, as the Meshwerks 
court recognized. The court stated, “[w]hile there is little authority 
explaining how our received principles of copyright law apply to the 
relatively new digital medium before us, some lessons may be discerned 
from how the law coped in an earlier time with a previous revolution in 
technology: photography.”127 
Fortunately, this previous technological revolution is one area of 
copyright where the United States has been at the forefront. Despite 
Herman Melville’s declaration that “[i]t is better to fail in originality than 
to succeed in imitation,”128 the fact that a copyright may be obtained in a 
photorealistic imitation of reality has been clear since Napoleon Sarony’s 
photographs of Oscar Wilde were found copyrightable in 1884.129 
Despite arguments that a photograph merely “copies everything and 
explains nothing”130 (the copies, of course, are unprotected by 
copyright), the Burrow-Giles Court welcomed photographs as “full-
fledged members of the copyright genus.”131 Photography was included 
as copyrightable subject matter in the 1909 Copyright Act.132 Under the 
1976 Copyright Act, section 102(a)(5)’s classification of “pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works” (PGS works), copyright “explicitly 
extends to photographs.”133 Digital artists engaged in recreating reality 
would be wise, however, to fully understand what exactly copyright 
does, and does not, protect—even in a photograph. 
Current copyright law in relation to photographs establishes specific 
 
 125. Id. at 1260. 
 126. Id. at 1263. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Hershel Parker, HERMAN MELVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 759 (Illus. ed., 2005). 
 129. See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 53 (1884). 
 130. SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2000) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 131. 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08 (2008). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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guidelines for determining when copyright protections apply. In Burrow-
Giles, the Supreme Court recognized that a photographer was an author, 
and exhibited the requisite creativity, by virtue of “posing [the 
subject] . . . , selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other 
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to 
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, 
suggesting and evoking the desired expression . . . .”134 These are the 
elements of the photograph protected by copyright, and Sarony had no 
claim to the depiction of Wilde himself because “Wilde’s inimitable 
visage does not belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to any photographer.”135 
Others could photograph or otherwise reproduce Wilde as they wished, 
as long as they did not copy the protected elements from Sarony’s 
photos. If another individual independently created those elements (for 
example, someone with no prior experience with Sarony’s work), Sarony 
would have no infringement claim and the subsequent author would 
acquire protection for the expressive elements in his or her own work. 
Likewise, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, the Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiff’s works, chromolithographs created to advertise a 
circus, were copyrightable even though they represented objects from 
real life.136 “Others are free to copy the original,” the Court opined. 
“They are not free to copy the copy.”137 
In Meshwerks, the models at issue were “unadorned, digital wire-
frames of Toyota’s vehicles.”138 The models formed the basic 
components of “computerized substitutes for product photographs” for 
Toyota to use on its website and in advertisements.139 The models 
allowed Toyota’s advertising agency to avoid the hassle of multiple 
photography shoots because, with the click of a mouse, “the advertiser 
can change the color of the car, its surroundings, and even edit its 
physical dimensions to portray changes in vehicle styling.”140 
Meshwerks created these digital models by taking copious measurements 
of Toyota’s vehicles by covering each car, truck, and van with a grid of 
tape and running an articulated arm tethered to a computer over the 
 
 134. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55. 
 135. Meshwerks v. Toyota, 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 
59); see also 1-3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[C][3] (2008) (“As applied to a photograph of a pre-
existing product, that bedrock principle [of originality] means that the photographer manifestly 
cannot claim to have originated the matter depicted therein . . . .”). 
 136. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) (“[E]ven if they had 
been drawn from the life, that fact would not deprive them of protection.”). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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vehicle to measure all points of intersection in the grid. Based on these 
measurements, modeling software generated a digital image resembling a 
wire-frame model. In other words, the vehicles’ data points 
(measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the 
modeling software connected the dots to create a “wire frame” of each 
vehicle.141 
Meshwerks’s employees, using the scanned data as reference, then 
“fine-tuned” or “sculpted” the models by manipulating approximately 
ninety percent of the individual data points to more accurately and 
realistically resemble the defendant’s vehicles.142 Because some aspects 
of the models (e.g., wheels, headlights, door handles, and emblems) 
“could not be accurately measured using current technology,” 
Meshwerks’s employees added these features manually by referring to 
photographs.143 They spent between 80–100 hours completing this 
second “sculpting” stage. After Meshwerks completed the basic models, 
Toyota’s advertising agency sent the models elsewhere for “color, 
texture, lighting, and animation.”144 
Toyota made use of the finished products in its advertising 
campaigns. Meshwerks filed suit because it objected to various 
subsequent uses of the models, including the fact that Toyota’s 
advertising agency sent one of Meshwerks’s wireframe models to one of 
Meshwerks’s direct competitors.145 Consequently, they sued Toyota for 
copyright infringement. In 2008, the Tenth Circuit held that 
Meshwerks’s digital wire-frame models of Toyota vehicles were not 
original and were not entitled to copyright protection, despite the 
substantial amount of effort involved in manually sculpting the models. 
The court affirmed summary judgment for Toyota while quoting from 
Feist: “[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, 
but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
conveyed by a work.”146 Implicitly, this meant Meshwerks’s competitors 
earned a free ride in Meshwerks’s model cars because the models alone 
did not contain creative elements of expression, such as camera and lens 
choice, lighting, color, and environment. Essentially, they were just the 
raw data based on preexisting design that allowed Toyota to later create 
copyrightable images. 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1260–61. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1258. 
 145. Id. at 1261 n.1. 
 146. Id. at 1262–63 (quoting Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 
(1991)). 
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Thus, without implementing creative elements of independent 
expression, it is unlikely there will be copyright protection. For example, 
in Meshwerks, the court affirmed summary judgment against the 
modeling company, and held that “the uncontested facts reveal that 
Meshwerks’s models owe their designs and origins to Toyota and 
deliberately do not include anything original of their own.”147 In short, 
they were “merely copies of Toyota’s products.”148 This holding would 
seem to apply equally to models of cars as well as models of human 
beings or buildings, and the fact that Meshwerks’s goal was to replicate 
Toyota’s vehicles as closely as possible only bolstered the court’s 
reasoning.149 The Meshwerks decision indicates that even those models 
created, at least partially, by digital sculpting techniques, rather than by 
scanning devices like those used in the case, would not be protected by 
virtue of the artist’s intent to replicate the original with fidelity. 
Importantly, the court’s analysis also compared the models to other PGS 
works, including photographs150 and sketches of automobile parts,151 
and did not discuss potential database protection for the scanned 
automobile data. This apparent lack of protection has serious 
consequences for companies like Meshwerks, who are involved in 
digitizing and modeling objects on a regular basis.152 
Although Meshwerks provides guidance as to what form of 
expression qualifies for copyright protection in the digital context, some 
questions inexorably remain. The Meshwerks court discussed the 
copyrightability of models after subsequent modeling companies had 
introduced color, lighting, and texture.153 The court also found a direct 
connection between photographs of Oscar Wilde and models of Toyota 
cars such that, 
 
the facts in this case unambiguously show that Meshwerks did 
 
 147. Id. at 1260. 
 148. Id. at 1261. 
 149. Id. at 1260. 
 150. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1263–64 (citing SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. 
Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2000); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 
59 (1884)). 
 151. Id. at 1269 (citing ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, 
Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 152. The services portion of Meshwerks’s website states that “Meshwerks routinely digitizes 
objects of all types and sizes, from the very small and ornate, to full-sized automobiles and beyond. 
Our highly accurate measuring systems are portable, allowing for on-site data acquisition almost 
anywhere.” See Meshwerks, http://www.meshwerks.com (click on “services”) (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
 153. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266 n.8. 
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not make any decisions regarding lighting, shading, the 
background in front of which a vehicle would be posed, the 
angle at which to pose it, or the like – in short, its models reflect 
none of the decisions that can make depictions of things or facts 
in the world, whether Oscar Wilde or a Toyota Camry, new 
expressions subject to copyright protection.154 
 
The Meshwerks holding reflects the intent of Feist. However, the 
application of these long held rules eschewing the “sweat of the brow” to 
the circumstances in Meshwerks presents a significant hurdle to those 
who create these types of digital wire-frame models, including those of 
human clones and commercial products, which parties will need to 
address by contract. This is especially true since protection for databases 
in the United States is currently limited to the creative arrangement of 
information under copyright and no sui generis database protection 
exists, unlike in the European Union.155 After all, the model itself is not 
subject to creative elements such as camera angle and lighting, it exists 
solely as a set of data points—an empty mesh. These creative elements 
are necessarily the province of the actual renderings of the model which, 
like the expressive elements of a photograph, are the proper subject 
matter of copyright, whether as PGS or audiovisual works. 
B. Originality and Industrious Collection Elsewhere: A Look at the 
Law in the United Kingdom and Australia 
Copyright laws in both the United States and Australia came into 
existence against the backdrop of England’s original copyright act, the 
Statute of Anne, in 1710.156 The current standard of originality in the 
United States, however, bears little resemblance to the present day 
standards in the United Kingdom and Australia.157 Contrary to the 
position in the United States after Feist, both U.K. and Australian courts 
have continued granting copyright protection to works based on 
 
 154. Id. at 1265. 
 155. See Beard, supra note 21 at 1178–80. 
 156. See Cristin Fenzel, Note, Still Life with "Spark" And "Sweat": The Copyrightability of 
Contemporary Art in the United States and the United Kingdom, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 541, 
557 (2007); Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85. 
 157. Except perhaps when it comes to database protection, where the originality standards of 
these countries—as well as Canada, the UK, and Ireland—have arguably been converging. See 
Bryce Newell, Out with the Old and in with the New: Converging Standards of Originality for 
Database Protection (unpublished), available at https://lawlib.wlu.edu/works/374-1.pdf, (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2010); see also the comparative discussion of originality in Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop 
Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, and Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565, 
¶¶ 28–36 (appeal taken from England). 
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industrious collection and “sweat of the brow” principles.158 In a recent 
Australian case applying copyright originality standards to a factual 
compilation, Telstra Corp. Ltd., v. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty. 
Ltd.,159 the Australian Federal Court confronted facts similar to those in 
Feist. In Telstra, however, the court declined to follow Feist’s line of 
reasoning, and held that the telephone directories were original—thus 
copyrightable.160 In Telstra, the plaintiff had created a number of white 
and yellow page telephone directories161 and claimed that the defendants 
had infringed its copyrights.162 The court examined British and 
American case law,163 including the Feist decision, and held that the 
plaintiff’s directories were copyrightable as a whole,164 explicitly 
rejecting the Feist rationale requiring a “spark of creativity”165 in favor 
of a “labour and expense” test. Because “Telstra had undertaken 
substantial labour and incurred substantial expense” in compiling and 
presenting the information in its directory, the directories were worthy of 
copyright protection.166 For a time, the Telstra decision appeared to 
reflect the generally accepted originality standard in Australia. However, 
in 2009, the Australian High Court indicated that the Telstra decision 
should be read with some caution. In IceTV v. Nine Network 
Australia,167 two concurring judgments of three judges each both 
disapproved of the analysis set out in the previous case, although it was 
ruling on a different issue.168 These judgments considered the proper test 
of originality to be the skill and effort directed at a particular form of 
expression rather than just a broad inquiry into expense and labor 
extended.169 The language in the judgment, however, is restricted to the 
context of compilations, and may reflect a change in standard applicable 
only to factual compilations. 
Recent decisions in England have confirmed the vitality of rewarding 
diligent effort with copyright protection. In 2005, the English Court of 
Appeal was confronted with a dispute over the copyrightability of 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612. 
 160. See id. ¶ 90. 
 161. Id. ¶ 1. 
 162. Id. ¶ 7. 
 163. Id. ¶¶ 50–85. 
 164. Id. ¶ 90. 
 165. Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85. 
 166. IceTV Pty. Ltd. v Nine Network Austl. Pty. Ltd., [2009] HCA 14, ¶ 133 (Judgment of 
Gummow J, Hayne J, Heydon J). 
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. Id.¶¶ 52, 134, 187–88. 
 169. See id. ¶ 52. 
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modern performing editions of public domain musical works in Sawkins 
v. Hyperion Records, Ltd.170 The court discussed the present state of the 
“sweat of the brow” doctrine and held: 
 
Reproductions requiring great talent and technical skill 
may qualify as protectable works of authorship, even if 
they are copies of pre-existing works. . . .”  In the end 
the question is one of degree: how much skill, labour 
and judgment in the making of the copy is that of the 
creator of that copy? Both individual creative input and 
sweat of brow may be involved and will be factors in the 
overall evaluation.171 
 
In that case, Dr. Lionel Sawkins had composed and recorded modern 
performances of music by Michel-Richard de Lalande, court composer 
for Louis XIV and Louis XV.172 In the suit, Dr. Sawkins claimed that his 
modern editions were original and that the defendant music publishing 
company had infringed his rights by refusing to pay royalties after 
distributing Sawkins’s sound recordings on CD.173 Sawkins spent 
approximately 300 hours to create the works at issue.174 His 
contributions included adding bass lines,175 re-creating missing viola 
parts,176 and modifying over 1000 notes to make the music playable.177 
In that case, Lord Justice Mummery concluded that “the effort, skill and 
time . . . spent in making the three performing editions” satisfied the 
originality requirement of copyright, “even though (a) Dr Sawkins 
worked on the scores of existing musical works composed by another 
person (Lalande); (b) Lalande’s works are out of copyright; and (c) Dr 
Sawkins had no intention of adding any new notes of music of his 
own.”178 The other two justices on the panel agreed.179 
The Sawkins decision came after the implementation of Britain’s 
current copyright statute, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
 
 170. Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565, ¶ 1. 
 171. Id. ¶ 83 (quoting Prof. Jane Ginsberg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative 
Copyright Law, available at http://ssrn.com.abstract_id=368481 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010)). 
 172. Id. ¶ 1. 
 173. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. 
 174. Id. ¶ 9. 
 175. Id. ¶ 8(1). 
 176. Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565, ¶ 8(2). 
 177. Id. ¶¶ 8(1), 8(3). 
 178. Id. ¶ 36 (emphasis added). 
 179. See id. ¶ 71 (judgment of Mance LJ) & ¶¶ 85–86 (judgment of Jacob LJ). 
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(CDPA) of 1988. Its holding was based on an interpretation of originality 
that existed in case law long before the word “original” ever appeared in 
a British copyright statute.180 The CPDA states that “Copyright is a 
property right which subsists . . . in the following descriptions of work—
original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.”181 The word 
“original” first appeared in the Copyright Act of 1911.182 The current 
definition of “work”—as fleshed out by the British courts—”is closely 
linked to the definition of ‘original.’”183 
This alternate approach to originality and the “sweat of the brow” or 
industrious collection doctrine has a long and rich history in English and 
Australian law. Prior to England’s Copyright Act of 1911 (which 
Australia adopted in 1912),184 the English courts had already begun to 
recognize that compilations were “of a different character” than works of 
art or literature, and that “the originality requirement for a compilation 
could not be the same as for other works.”185 British courts recognized 
copyrights in court calendars,186 a “dry list of names” in a chemist’s 
alphabetically arranged stock list,187 street directories,188 trade 
directories,189 and, in the landmark case of Walter v. Lane,190 a 
reporter’s written record of a public speech.191 
The Telstra court concluded, after reviewing these older English 
cases, that these decisions stood for the proposition that “copyright 
protection could be claimed by a person who brought out a directory in 
consequence of an expensive, complicated and well organised venture, 
even if there was no creativity in the selection or arrangement of the 
 
 180. Fenzel, supra note 157, at 569. 
 181. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 1(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter CDPA]: 
Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following 
descriptions of work— 
(a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, 
(b) sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable programs, and 
(c) the typographical arrangement of published editions.   Id. 
The Act defines “artistic work” as: (a) a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective 
of artistic quality, (b) a work of architecture being a building or a model for a building, or (c) a work 
of artistic craftsmanship. Id. § 4(1). 
 182. Fenzel, supra note 157, at 569. 
 183. Id. at 569. 
 184. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85. 
 185. Id. ¶ 84. 
 186. Id. ¶ 51 (quoting Matthewson v. Stockdale, (1806) 12 Ves. 270; 33 ER 103, 105–06). 
 187. Id. ¶ 49 (citing Collis v. Cater, Stoffell and Fortt Ltd., (1898) 78 LT (NS) 613 (1898)). 
 188. Id. ¶ 52 (quoting Kelly v. Morris, (1866) 1 Eq 697, 701-02 (1866)). 
 189. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612, ¶ 53 (quoting Morris v. Ashbee  7 Eq 34, 40–41 
(1868)). 
 190. Walter v. Lane, [1900] AC 539 (Eng.). 
 191. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612, ¶ 56 (citing Walter AC 539, 546–58). 
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data.192 Thus, these cases held that intellectual effort is not required to 
obtain copyright, only “sufficient work involved and expense incurred in 
gathering the facts or other data.193 
English case law after the Copyright Act of 1911 has rarely denied 
copyright to compilations of data, yet decisions have been somewhat 
unpredictable.194 For example, in one case, a railway timetable’s index, 
updated monthly, was copyrightable.195 In another, it was not.196 The 
difference appears to be the result of the different amount of labor and 
expense invested by the respective plaintiffs.197 Summing up the last 
century or so of British case law on the subject, the Telstra court 
concluded, “[c]opyright will subsist if there has been sufficient 
intellectual effort in the selection or arrangement of the facts. It will also 
subsist if the author has engaged in sufficient work or incurred sufficient 
expense in gathering the facts.”198 The Sawkins decision appears to 
validate this conclusion. 
There have been some cases, however, that demonstrate that even 
English “sweat of the brow” principles will not always protect copies of 
existing works (photographs in particular) or other items. In the English 
High Court case of Antiquesportfolio.com v. Rodney Fitch & Co.,199 
Neuberger J. (quoting Nimmer on Copyright) stated that in cases of 
slavish copying, such as photographing another photograph or two-
dimensional work of art or recreating exactly a prior scene and taking 
another photograph in an effort to copy the first, no originality could be 
found under English law. The court also quoted from a U.S. case, 
Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel,200 which applied U.K. law and denied 
copyright in such a photograph due to lack of originality.201 On the other 
hand, “if the photographer in such a case could show that he had in fact 
used some degree of skill and care in taking the photograph,” he might 
be able to claim copyright.202 In AntiquesPortfolio.com, the Judge found 
that simple catalog photographs of “individual antiques such as items of 
furniture, glassware, metal-work, sculpture and the like”203 exhibited the 
 
 192. Id. ¶ 84 (emphasis added). 
 193. Id. ¶ 50. 
 194. Id. ¶ 62. 
 195. Id. ¶ 61 (citing H. Blacklock & Co. Ltd., v. C. Arthur Pearson Ltd., [1915] 2 Ch 376). 
 196. Id. ¶ 62 (citing Leslie v. J. Young & Sons., [1894] AC 335). 
 197. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612¶ 61–62. 
 198. Id. ¶ 64 (emphasis added). 
 199. Antiquesportfolio.com v Rodney Fitch & Co., [2001] E.C.D.R. 5 (2000). 
 200. Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (1998). 
 201. Id. at 426–28. 
 202. AntiquesPortfolio.com, [2001] E.C.D.R. 5, ¶ 33. 
 203. Id. ¶ 13. 
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required originality204 because “[i]n the case of photographs of a three-
dimensional object . . . the positioning of the object (unless it is a 
sphere), the angle at which it is taken, the lighting and the focus, and 
matters such as that, could all be matters of aesthetic or even commercial 
judgment.”205 The court continued to justify its holding by stating that 
“some degree of skill was [also] involved in the lighting, angling and 
judging the positioning” of the objects.206 
The explicit rejection of Feist by the Australian and English courts 
would appear to allow copyright protection for the models in a case like 
Meshwerks as long as the creation of the models involved a significant 
investment of time, skill, and effort. Arguably, the hours of “digital 
sculpting” and modeling of certain additional portions of the overall 
models in that case would have survived attack under the industrious 
collection standard in these jurisdictions. However, part of the problem 
of analyzing protection for digital models, at least in their basic 
subsistence as editable wire-frame meshes, is figuring out where they 
ought to fit within the various subject matter of copyright, or whether 
they might more properly fit under a distinct database protection regime. 
If the artistic or PGS works categories are appropriate, as the United 
States Tenth Circuit appears to have assumed, they will be subject in the 
United States to the same requirements of originality as for other PGS or 
artistic copyright works of art after Feist. In this situation, U.S. law 
appears to grant less protection potentially than do “sweat of the brow” 
regimes like the U.K. or Australia. However, if the digital models were 
considered databases (which they might properly be, as digital 
compilations of numerous X, Y, and Z coordinates and related 
information), the current state of database protection in the European 
Union might not actually provide any greater protection than would 
copyright law in the United States.207 Potentially, however, under a dual 
copyright and sui generis database regime, digital models could find 
protection under both. 
IV. DATABASE PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL MODELS: IS THERE SUCH A 
THING? 
Over the past decade or so, the U.S. Congress has “considered—and 
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 205. Id. ¶ 34. 
 206. Id. ¶ 35. 
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considered—and considered data base protection.”208 Database 
protection bills have been introduced in the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 
and 108th Congresses—none have become law.209 As a result, the strict 
originality requirements of Feist apply to any potential copyright 
protection for databases and other compilations in the United States.210 
There has also been a debate about the constitutionality of these 
congressional attempts to provide protection for databases beyond that 
granted by copyright, based on the premise that such protection would 
“alter the balance between protection and public access/competition 
embodied in the Copyright and Patent Clause” of the U.S. 
Constitution.211 
The international approach to the problem consists of varying levels 
of protection. A number of countries currently do not provide sui generis 
protection, and others protect databases through copyright, subject to 
varying interpretations of originality.212 The major international treaties 
have also not done much to provide protection for “non-original” 
databases.213 The Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement, and WIPO 
Copyright Treaty all condition database protection on the requirement 
that they are independent “intellectual creations,”214 predicated on the 
author’s contribution of “non-trivial, non-mechanical choices.”215 
Additionally, WIPO’s proposed treaty on the legal protection of 
databases remains in draft form years after its inception.216 The 
European Union has taken some initiative on the issue. However, it 
remains unclear whether the resulting Directive would protect “non-
original” databases such as the Meshwerks models. 
 
 208. Beard, supra note 21, at 1180. 
 209. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1142; see also Beard, supra note 21, at 1180; Database and 
Collections of Information Misappropriation Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (statement of David O. Carson, General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office) [hereinafter 
Carson Statement], available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat092303.html (last visited 
March 15, 2010); Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th 
Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.3261 (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 
 210. See Gervais, supra note 81, at 1131–37. 
 211. Id. at 1142. 
 212. See id. at 1148–57 (comparing protection in a variety of countries). 
 213. Id. at 1118. 
 214. Id. at 1114–18. 
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 216. Id. at 1119. 
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A. Sui Generis Protection Under the E.U. Database Directive 
European Union Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of 
databases217 (the Directive) provides sui generis protection for databases 
that have been created by “the investment of considerable human, 
technical and financial resources.”218 Apparently, the Directorate-
General introduced the Directive as an antidotal response to Feist.219 The 
intent of the Directive was to expand protection beyond the “limited 
reach of copyright caused by the originality/creativity requirement.”220 
Under the Directive, injured parties can find relief, regardless of 
copyright, whenever another party extracts or reutilizes a “qualitatively 
or quantitatively substantial part of the database.”221 
The Directive itself protects copyrightable and uncopyrightable data 
that has economic value, and grants fifteen years of protection to the 
maker of the database, separate and distinct from any potential copyright 
protection.222 Protection under the Directive does not affect copyright 
status in otherwise copyrightable data.223 In order for protection to 
adhere, the maker of the database must have made a qualitatively or 
quantitatively substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or 
presenting the data.224 Recital 17 of the Directive defines its scope: 
 
Whereas the term “database” should be understood to 
include literary, artistic, musical or other collections of 
work or collections of other material such as texts, 
sound, images, numbers, facts, and data; whereas it 
should cover collections of independent works, data or 
other material which are systematically or methodically 
arranged and can be individually accessed; whereas this 
means that a recording on an audiovisual, 
cinematographic, literary or musical work as such does 
not fall within the scope of this Directive.225 
 
 217. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the legal protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Directive], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 
 218. Beard, supra note 21, at 1178 nn.62–68. 
 219. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1120. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1123. 
 222. Beard, supra note 21, at 1178. 
 223. Id. at 1178–79. 
 224. Id. at 1179. 
 225. Directive, supra note 218, at recital 17; see also Beard, supra note 21, at 1179. 
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Professor Joseph Beard analyzed potential protection for digital 
scans of human subjects under both copyright and database theories.226 
Of the scan data’s relationship to copyrightable subject matter, Beard 
said, “The digital capture of the actor’s static visual data is the equivalent 
of a three-dimensional photograph or a sculpture.”227 Beard also looked 
at potential protection for scan data under the E.U. Database Directive, 
and concluded that it is not clear that that theory would protect the data 
either.228 Professor Beard felt that scan data might not fit within the 
Directive’s requirement of independent data that “can be individually 
accessed.”229 However, evinced by the Meshwerks’s employees re-
sculpting of the scan data for the Toyota cars during the modeling 
process, digital artists can access and manipulate each discrete data point 
individually through modeling software, referenced by their distinct 
XYZ coordinates. On the other hand, the application of these traditional 
notions of accessibility and independent data to the realm of digital 
modeling and its specific qualities remains untested, and Professor Beard 
might well be correct. Commentators have said that the mere conversion 
of analog material to a digital format is likely insufficient to qualify as a 
substantial investment.230 However, substantial verification or updating 
of this material might be.231 Whether it was this type of updating and 
verification that Meshwerks engaged in after their initial scans remains 
questionable. Indeed, some commentators have said recent cases in 
Europe have shown that the Directive provides even less protection for 
fact-based compilations than U.S. copyright law after Feist.232 
In 2004, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) limited the scope of the 
Directive’s protection when it clarified the amount of investment 
required to obtain protection under the sui generis right.233 The court 
articulated a “spin-off” theory, and held that substantial investment in 
obtaining, presenting, or verifying pre-existing data would enable the 
creator to benefit from protection, while investment in creating the data 
would not.234 In holding that the Directive did not protect the investment 
 
 226. See Beard, supra note 21. 
 227. Id. at 1177. 
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 230. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1126. 
 231. Id. 
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 234. Id. at 1127. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 6 
124 
 
at issue in the Fixtures Mktg. cases (football fixture data), the ECJ held 
that 
 
[f]inding and collecting the data which make up a 
football fixture list do[es] not require any particular 
effort on the part of the professional leagues. Those 
activities are indivisibly linked to the creation of those 
data, in which the leagues participate directly as those 
responsible for the organization of football league 
fixtures. Obtaining the contents of a football fixture list 
thus does not require any investment independent of that 
required for the creation of the data contained in that 
list.235 
 
Similarly in British Horseracing Bd. v. William Hill,236 the ECJ 
stated that the effort and investment in organizing horse races and 
collecting and verifying the large amounts of data at issue constituted 
investment only in creating the data—not in obtaining, presentation, or 
verification.237 Following these decisions by the ECJ, a Dutch court, in 
Zoekallehuizen.nl v. NVM,238 attempted to make the distinction between 
these different types of investment. That court held that creating property 
descriptions and taking photographs of properties to be posted on a real 
estate website did not qualify as substantial investment—despite the fact 
that such investment required the expenditure of both time and 
resources.239 This distinction between obtaining data and activities 
which are “indivisibly linked” to the creation of data might frustrate the 
attempts of a digitization firm such as Meshwerks in their attempt to 
secure database rights in the E.U., because the data generated while 
modeling the Toyota vehicles (even the manually sculpted data) was 
likely the necessary byproduct of the undertaking itself. Thus, it was 
created and not obtained, as required by the ECJ. 
Indeed, the formidable volume of case law spawned by the Directive, 
both in national courts and the ECJ, has, to the despair of database 
makers everywhere, turned to “a pronounced hostility to affording either 
 
 235. Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 E.C.R. I-10365 at [59] (emphasis added). 
 236. British Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd. [2005] 1 CMLR 319. 
 237. Id., at [80], [39]–[41]. 
 238. Arrondissementsrechtbank [District Court], Arnhem, Mar. 16, 2006, (Neth.), more details 
available at 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AV5236&u_ljn=
AV5236 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
 239. Clark, supra note 232, at 99. 
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copyright protection or sui generis protection to ‘factual’ databases” 
because they lack originality or substantial investment.240 This hostility 
appears to be in opposition to the intent of the Directive’s drafters,241 
because it draws European database law closer, rather than away from, 
the result in Feist.242 In the United Kingdom and Ireland, the 
amendments to the CDPA and Copyright and Related Rights Act of 
2000243 implementing the Directive now only protect works that 
constitute the author’s own “intellectual creation,” “which seems to hold 
compilations to a Feist-like standard”244 and represents a heightened 
standard for original databases.245 
V. CONCLUSION 
It seems clear that copyright protects digital models, even those that 
replicate reality, when they include elements of creativity, such as color, 
shading, texturing, animation, and lighting. Additionally, it is clear that 
copyright protects renderings of digital models, such as Studio 
Macbeth’s images and video of Lincoln and Benjamin Button’s head in 
Fincher’s film, as either artistic or audiovisual works. However, as the 
Meshwerks studio discovered all too late, copyright and database laws in 
the United States, and perhaps elsewhere, do not protect the basic models 
themselves. Perhaps the digital artist’s sweat will secure protection in 
those jurisdictions that recognize labor and skill as elements of 
originality. Potentially, other theories based in contract, tort (including 
misappropriation),246 or some other theory such as trespass to chattels247 
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may provide some answers for model creators in the U.S., although these 
issues are outside the scope of this Article. The landmark originality and 
creativity requirements of Feist protect the vitally important public 
domain and provide free access to factual information by protecting 
creativity, not investment. However, this lack of protection for databases 
created through significant amounts of physical or financial investment 
may prove economically unwise if it lowers incentive to create, although 
this result has not been borne out in research on the results of 
implementing the E.U. Database Directive.248 Perhaps, in this particular 
situation—the entertainment world of three-dimensional virtual reality—
the incentives offered by any potential sui generis database right are too 
minimal to be important. Perhaps, as one commentator put it, 
“[c]opyright is not the proper vehicle to protect these non-creative, non-
original compilations,”249 and we should leave it to the other possible 
theories to provide protection. In any event, the U.S. Congress may 
continue to consider the merits of database protection beyond that 
provided by copyright. If it does, it should do so with an eye to the 
importance the Constitution places on preserving the public domain. If a 
database protection act becomes inevitable, and it surely might given the 
rising amount of information stored, organized, and available in digital 
networks, Congress should pass legislation that will protect valuable 
‘factual’ data compilations from unauthorized access and reutilization in 
a way that preserves public access to information. However, until that 
day comes, and even if it does, digital artists, entertainment companies, 
actors, and digitizing companies need to understand the potential risks 
involved and protect themselves through contract and technological data 
protection measures. 
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